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PANT v. AUDITOR OF
the proceedings will be liable to re-
versal on a writ of error: Hamilton v.
The Commonwealth, 4 Harris 129; Dunn
v. The Commonwealth, 6 Barr 384; Keely
v. The State, 3 Sm. & Mar. 518 ; Gra-
/,am v. The State, 40 Ala. 660; The
S:ate v. Matthews, 20 Mo. 55.
In cases not capital, less strictness
perhaps is required in insisting upon a
direct statement in the record of tho de-
fendant's presence. See Holmes v. The
Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St. 221. In
ordinary cases it is sufficient if the pre-
sence of the prisoner may be inferred
from the record by fair intenament.
See State v. Craton, 6 Ired. 164;
Stephens v. Ti People, 19 N. Y. 549;
Grimm v. The People, 14 Mich. 300;
State v. Steeffle, 13 Iowa 603.
It does not follow, however, that be-
cause a verdict is rendered in the de-
fendant's absence he is to be discharged;
it is merely a mis-trial, and the verdict
should be set aside and the defendant
triedagain : People v..Perkins, I Wend.
91; State v. Hughes, 2 Alabama 102;
Younger v. &tate, 2 W. Va. 579. And
if present when the verdict is returned,
but absent when sentence is pronounced,
he is not entitled to a new trial, but
only to a new sentence. If the former
judgment is reversed on error for the
prisoner's absence, he is simply remand-
ed for sentence according to law : Cole
v. The State, 5 Eng. 318 ; Kelly v. The
State, 3 Sm. & Mar. 518.
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So essential is it deemed that the
prisoner should be present in court
when the verdict is returned (especially
in capital cases), that it has been
thought that neither he nor his counsel
could waive the right, and that it would
be erroneous to proceed without him
even by his own consent. See Nomague
v. The People, Breese 109; Prine v. The
Commonwealth, 6 Harris 103.
But, as held in the principal case, it
is not necessary on hearings in his own
behalf, as on a writ of error, or motion
for a new trial, that he should be per-
sonaIly present ; certainly not, if not
confined in jail, but out on bail, and
when his absence is purely voluntary.
See The People v. Clark, I Parker C. C.
360; Rex v. Boltz, 8 D. & R. 65,
where he was in prison and too poor-
to pay the expenses of bringing him
into oourt.
What has been said above in regard
to the defendant's presence relates to
felonies. In misdemeanors less strict-
ness is required, and the trial may, by
leave of court, often proceed, and the
verdict be rendered, and sentence of a
fine be pronounced, in the defendant's
absence. See United States v. Mayo, I
Curtis C. C. 433; Sou v. 7he People,
12 Wend. 344; Canada v. The Common-
wealth, 9 Dana 304; Warren v. The
State, 19 Ark. 214; Holliday v. The
People, 4 Gilman 11.
EDxUND H. BENNETT.
pupreme Court of Miigsippi.
JAMES T. PANT v. THE AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.
Where the term of a public office is fixed by the constitution the legislature can-
not directly or indirectly remove the incumbent. The inability to do so proceeds
rather from the absence of legislative power than from any idea of a contract
between the incumbent and the state.
It is immaterial that the constitution has not prescribed the number of officials
who are to hold for the prescribed term, but has left the number discretionarywith
the legislature. When by law provision has been made for a certain number,
VoL'. XXV.-93
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and they have been lawfully chosen, they are protected for the term, as they would
have been had the constitution itself indicated how many there should be.
Under such circumstances a reduction of the number of officers can only take
effect at the end of the term of existing incumbents.
To take from an officer the authority to perform the duties of the office, is
equivalent to a removal, and consequently is incompetent when a direct removal
is forbidden.
Where therefore the term of oflice of district attorneys was prescribed by the
constitution, and the statute had fixed the number of these officers at thirteen, with
a salary of $1200 each, and the legislature afterwards reduced the districts 'to
eleven, and provided that two of the incumbents should act only in the counties
of their residence respectively, and only in the absence of the district attorney
assigned to the district embracing such county, and should receive a salary of $100
each only : Ifeld, that this action was void, as ai indirect attempt to deprive two
of the incumbents of their offices; and consequently those incumbents were enti-
tled to the salaries previously established.
APPLICATION to compel payment of an official salary.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHALMERS, J.-The proposition that the legislature cannot
directly or Indirectly remove the incumbent of an office created by
,the constitution during a term 'fixed by that instrument, needs no
argument nor elucidation.
If not originally self-evident it has by a long and unbroken series
of decisions become axiomatic. No one will contend, for instance,
that any act of legislation could abridge the term of an incumbent
of the gubernatorial office, or that of the attorney-general or auditor
of public accounts.
No matter what disguise might be adopted or how plausible the
means devised, it would be the duty of this court to scan *rigidly
any act that seemed to contemplate such an end, and to pronoune
void any provision the practical effect of which was to accomplish
such a result.
This doctrine does not proceed upon the idea that the state has
entered into a contract with the incumbent by which she has irre-
vocably bound herself to accept his services for a specified period;
though it is undoubtedly true that in some sense and for mtny
purposes an office is a contract and the incumbency of it a right of
property which the courts will protect.
But the fundamental principle which prohibits the removal by
legislation of a constitutional officer during a constitutional term,
is that the framers of the organic law, by creating the office and
specifying the term, have unmistakably indicated their will first,
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that the state shall always have such an officer, and, secondly, that
the duration of the term of each incumbent shall depend not on
legislative will, but on the solid basis of an ordinance that cannot
be changed save by a change in the constitution itself.
Incumbency for the prescribed term by each holder of the office
is as important as that the office itself shall exist. The legislature
can no more abridge the one than they can abolish the other.
It is needless to remark that if by any device it is permitted to
oust an officer during his term, full control over the terms is ac-
quired, for if one legislature can eject an obnoxious offictr the suc-
ceeding one may dispense with the services of his successor, and
thus, while nominally preserving the term, no incumbent will be
allowed to enjoy it.
The inhibition against this proceeds rather from the absence of
legislative power than from any idea of a contract between the state
and the officeholder.
The correctness of these views will not be questioned where only
one officer of a class is prescribed by the constitution, as in the case
of the governor or attorney-general, nor where a fixed number is
established, as is the case with the judges of this court and the super-
visors of the several counties.
But it is suggested that where the constitution merely directs
that a suitable number or a competent number of a certain desig-
nated class of officers shall bb elected or appointed, and leaves that
number to be determined by the legislature, the power to establish
carries with it the power to change, and that therefore, even though
a fixed term is prescribed, each legislature must judge of the num-
ber needed by the state, and that the judgment of one legislature
on this question cannot bind a succeeding one.
It is said, for instance, that the constitution of this state gives
terms of fixed duration to the judges, chancellors, district attorneys,
.Justices of the peace and constables, but leaves the number of these
officials to be wholly regulated by the legislative will and hence
each legislature must determine for itself how many are necessary.
It is theiefore insisted that whether all incumbents shall remain
in office during the full constitutional terms for which ihey were
chosen, must depend on whether the legislature deems that the state
so long requires the services of the entire number.
This view we deem wholly untenable, because utterly subversive
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of the end intended to be accomplished by the constitutional specifi-
cation of terms. We cannot doubt that if such had been the inten-
tion of the framers of the constitution they would have left the
duration of the terms, as well as the number, of those offices to legis-
lative discretion.
Evidently two antagonistic evils which lurked on either side of
the public weal were intended to be equally guarded against, by
giving to these offices fixed terms, but leaving their number to leg-
islative will. One of these was the imposition on the state of a
horde of superfluous officers, who, holding their places for life or
through long terms prescribed by the body that brought them into
existence, should prove useless and costly burdens on the. state.
The other was the evil to some extent inseparable from republican
institutions which springs from frequent and violent changes in the
offices of the state with every variation in popular caprice.
Both of these ills were guarded against by affixing definite and
short terms to these offices and leaving their number to be deter-
niined by the legislature. Thus at frequently recurring intervals
the legislature could ascertain how many judges and district attorneys
were necessary, and could order their election or appointment; but
when chosen they must be permitted to serve out the full terns
prescribed by the constitution, unless sooner removed in the modes
pointed out in that instrument.
If the constitution had undertaken to determine the exact num-
ber of these offices it might have inflicted on us a number greatly in
excess of our needs, or it might have crippled the entire judiciary
system by a supply totally inadequate to the requirements of the
public service.
On the other hand, if it had left their terms wholly at the legis-
lative mercy, with every change of parties in that body, there would
have been a wholesale change in the judiciary of the state. It is
impossible to imagine anything more disastrous than this to the
welfare of the Commonwealth, and we are unable to perceiVe any
method of avoiding it wiser and better than the one adopted.
We would not abridge the power of the legislature -to decide as
.to the number needed, but'it must be exercised in subordination to
the equally plain requirement that their terms when chosen shall
not be interfered with.
Each clause in the constitution is equally important with every
other clause, and no one clause can be sacrificed to another.
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The authority to determine the number of these officials therefore
must be exercised in harmony with their constitutionally prescribed
terms; and this can only be done by holding that such qetermina-
tion must be arrived at before the commencement of the term, and
cannot thereafter be changed until it has expired.
If this construction sometimes inflicts on the state for a few years
one or more supernumerary officers, this is infinitely better than
that this whole class of important officials, comprising almost the
entire body of the judiciary of the state, should be at the mercy of
the dominant party in each successive legislature.
It is said that no system of government is perfect, and that power
must be lodged somewhere. The wisdom of the remark is undoubted,
and its application may be found in the consideration that the legis-
lature will not ordinarily provide for a horde of unnecessary officers,
but if they should do so, the evil need only be endured until the
expiration of the .terms of those first chosen. Then and not till
then the corrective can be applied.
These remarks of course have no application to offices created by
the legislature as to which their power is unlimited.
If this precise question has not heretofore been decided in this
state in a case where the number of officers to be chosen was left to
legislative discretion, the views here announced have been so often
and for so long a period foreshadowed in our decisions that we can-
not think that they are novel. either to the profession or to the peo-
ple at large. They will be found intimated with more or less dis-
tinctuess in .Runnels v. T!e State, Walker 146; Hughes v. Buck-
ingham, 5 S. & M. 647; State v. Smedes &' Marshall, 26 Miss.
47; HleAfee v. Russel, 29 Id. 96; Brady v. zlowe, 50 Id. 621;
Cooke v. Newsom, 44 Id. 361; Brady v. West, 50 Id. 68; State
v. .French, 52 Id. 759; Hyde v. The tate, 53 Id.
In other states the exact question has been uniformly settled in
consonance with these views, though not always upon grounds which
meet our entire concurrence. We agree with these cases, however,
in the result reached, namely, that a constitutional term is as much
beyond legislative interference where the legislature has the power
to fix the number of officers as where the number is fixed in the
organic law: People v. Dubois, 23 Ill. 547; Commonwealth v.
a-amble, 62 Penn. St. 43; Lowe v. Commonwealth, 8 Metc. (Ky.)
237; State v. Atessmorej 14 Wis. 163.Having arrived at the conclusion that no incumbent of a consti-
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tutional office can be displaced during the continuance of a consti-
tutional term, and that this principle is in no manner affected by
the delegation to the legislature of the power to determine the num-
ber of officers required by the necessities of the state, let us apply
this principle to the case at bar, keeping in view the further pro-
position that a constitutional inhibition of a certain result includes
every possible method by which that result can be accomplished.
The relator was elected to the office of district attorney of the
tenth judicial district for the constitutional term of four years, at
the general election in November 1875, and having been duly com-
missioned, entered upon the duties of his office in January 1876.
This term will expire 1st of January 1880.
There were at the date of his election thirteen judicial districts
in the state, and there was one district attorney for each. They
were each entitled, by the law then and still in force, .to an annual
salary of 1200, besides fees of office.
During the spring of 1876 the terms of office of all the circuit
judges in the state expired, and the legislature perceiving that there
was no necessity for so many as thirteen, on the 4th of April 1876
passed an act by which the number of the districts wad reduced from
thirteen to eleven, but they were careful to provide by a supple-
mental act that it would' not take effect until the expiration of the
terms of judges then.in office. In the appointment of their succes-
sors, eleven judges only were commissioned, but no provision hav-
ing been made with reference to the district attorneys, there were
left in office three more of these oficers than there were districts.
To remedy this supposed evil, the legislature, at its next session,
passed an act entitled "An act to assign district attorneys in the
judicial districts of the state." Approved February 1st 1876
In the changes in the boundaries of the districts produced by the
Act of April 1876, two or more district attorneys had been in some
instances thrown into one district, while in other districts none were
left.
The object of the Act of February 1~t 1877 was twofold; first,
to have one district attorney assigned to each district, and, second,
to rid the public treasury as far as possible of the burden of super-
numeraries.
This assignment was ordered to be made by the governor, who
was directed by the law that where only one district attorney re-
sided in a district he should be retained, and that where two or more
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resided in the same district, that one should be retained that had
been voted for by the electors of a plurality of the counties in the dis-
trict. Those who should under this arrangement be left unassigned
were not by special enactment displaced from office, but they were
left without any duties or any territory within. which they could
officially act, except that it was provided that they might officiate
in the counties of their residence in the absence of the assigned
officer.
The salaries of the unassigned officials were fixed at $100, while
those of the others were left at $1200. The fees of the office would
of course belong to the officers left on active duty.
The relator, Fant, was unassigned. He brings this writ of man-
damus to compel the payment of his full salary of $1200, and it is
agreed by counsel that we shall consider and pass upon the consti-
tutionality of the Act of February 1877, without regard to matters
of form.
It is at once evident that we are not called upon to pass upon
the constitutionality of so much of the act as directs the assignment
of district attorneys, except in so far as its effect is to displace some
incumbent, and it is unnecessary therefore to decide whether such
assignments are valid in districts where no collisions are created.
We would remark, however, that we are not inclined to adopt the
views Announced by some of the courts to the effect that an officer
can have a vested territorial right in the particular counties compos-
ing the district in which he was elected. We entertain no doubt
of the legislative power to change the boundaries of districts.
Let us inquire into the validity of the act with reference to those
officers left unassigned. It is evident that its constitutionality in
this respect must depend on whether it amounts to a practical dis-
placement of such officers.
Sect. 25 of art. 6 of the constitution is in these words: "There
shall be an attorney-general elected by the qualified electors of
the state, and a competent number of district attorneys shall be
elected by the qualified electors of the respective districts, whose
term of service shall be four years and whose duty and compensation
shall be prescribed by law."
It will be noted that full authority is confided to the legislature
to regulate the duties and compensation of the district attorneys and
to create the districts in which they shall be elected. Their term
alone seems to be beyond legislative control.
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But a grant of power to regulate specified matters of detail, so
far from including the authority to abolish them, ambunts fre-
quently to an express negation of authority. Thus when it is in
effect declared by this section that the legislature may prescribe the
duties and compensation of district attorneys and lay off their dis-
tricts, it is an implied prohibition of the power to deprive them of
all duties and all compensation and leave them without districts.
It may enlarge or curtail their districts, but it must leave some
district. It may add to or subtract from their duties, but it must
leave some duties. It may increase or diminish their compensation,
but it must leave some compensation.
It is evident that the law in question violates, with reference to
the relator, two of these requirements. It has left him neither
district nor duties. There is not a court in the state in which he
has the right to prosecute a criminal or enter a nolleprosequi. There
is not a grand jury room in which his presence would not be an
unauthorized and unlawful intrusion.
He may indeed, in the absence of the district attorney, who has
been assigned to his district, appear in the county of his residence,
but this is wholly independent of his own volition or that of the
presiding judge, and rests wholly on the caprice or convenience of
the assigned officer. Certainly this is neither giving him a district
nor permitting him to exercise any of the duties of office.-
If he can be said to be an officer at all he certainly occupies a
most anomalous position.
Can a man be said to be an officer of the state when there is not
within the limits a spot where he is allowed to perform any function
of the office which he is supposed to fill ? Has not the relator been
as effectually removed from office as if the legislature had declared
in explicit terms that from and after a certain date James T. Fant
should cease to be a district attorney? To ask these questions is*
to answer them. We conclude, therefore, that the act is clearly
unconstitutional in depriving him of the right to perform any
official acts.
But 't is said that the legislature has the right to diminish his
compensation at pleasure, that a salary of $100 per annum has been
left him, and that as this writ is only prosecuted to assert a right to
an undiminished salary, we can consider no other question than
this.
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The point is not free from difficulty and has cost us much thought.
It is true that the legislature has full control over the salary as well
as over the duties and the districts. We are not prepared to say
that it may not graduate the compensation according to the labor
imposed, and if it had seen fit to reduce the tenth district to a single
county and to have fixed the salary of the incumbent at $100, we
are not prepared to say that the act would have been invalid, though
upon this point we express no opinion, because it may be that the
framers of the constitution, in speaking of the districts of district
attorneys, must, in view of the past history of the state, be held to
have contemplated districts co-extensive with the territory presided
over by a single circuit judge.
But we are not presented such a case and we must look at the
whole law in its practical effects on the relator.
He has neither duties nor district, and the salary left him must
therefore be regarded either as a pension or as a compensation for
possible duties which he may never be called upon to perform. In
either aspect it is wholly at war with the genius of our institutions.
The legislature has exclusive control over the salary of the attorney-
general. Suppose then that it should enact that all the duties of
that officer shouldbe performed by the district attorney residing in
the Jackson district, but in the absence of that officer the attorney-
general might continue to act, and that his salary should be $100,
could this court hesitate td declare such an act unconstitutional ?
And yet that is, mutatiR mutandi, the case at bar.
By sect. 7 of art. 12, it is made the duty of the legislature "to
provide suitable compensation for all officers."
It would be an exceedingly delicate matter for this court to
declare, that the compensation provided for any officer was not
suitable, and would certainly never do so, where the salary, however
low, had been fixed on a basis deemed by the legislature to be suffi-
cient, but where it was clearly not so fixed, but was a mere partisan
device to get rid of an obnoxious officer, it might be our duty to
interfere.
Suppos6 for instance, that a legislature dominated by a political
party different from that of the officers belonging to the state depart-
ments in the capitol should reduce their salaries to five dollars per
'annum. In such a case we might feel compelled to interpose.
VOL. XXV.-94
FANT v. AUDITOR OF PUBLIC -ACCOUNTS.
We rest our objection, however, to the law under review upon
the ground that it is clearly unconstitutional, in depriving the re-
lator of both duties and a district, and inasmuch as the compensa-
tion left is manifestly based upon this absence of duties, it must be
condemned also.
We cannot imagine, for a moment, that the legislature would
have prescribed such a salary except upon the idea that the remain-
ing portions of the act were valid, and inasmuch as the one is
dependent upon the other, they must stand or fall together. While
it is true that one portion of a law may be upheld while the rest is
overthrown, this is only true when they are so far independent
propositions that it may be presumed that the legislature intended
one to subsist even though the balance perished.
But where the entire scheme must fail because of want of power
to enact it, there can be no possible good in upholding an isolated
provision which was perhaps competent for the lawgiver to enact,
but which is unreasonable and unjust if left to stand alone.
Some years ago this court pronounced unconstitutional a statute
which undertook to create the office of tax-collector in the several
counties, and to deprive the sheriffs of the duty of collecting the
public revenue. Suppose that there had been a salary attached to
the collection of taxes and that this act had contained a provision
that thereafter the sheriffs should receive no such salary. Such a
clause by itself would have been constitutional. But can there- be
any doubt that it-would have fallen with the balance of .the act,
and that the sheriff who in defiance of the act had collected the
taxes would have been entitled to the salary? The principle is
that where a particular clause of the statute is manifestly based
upon certain other clauses, which are pronounced unconstitutional,
it will fall with'them, though itself not obnoxious t constitutional
objections.
If the legislature annex certain duties to a particular office, with
an added compensation therefor, and the addition of the duties is
declared unconstitutional, it is manifest that the officer cannot claim
the compensation.
The converse of the proposition must also be true, that if they
attempt to strip an officer of all duty, and consequently, and as
part of the same act, abolish his salary, he will not lose the salary,
even though they had a right to abolish it, if the attempt to strip
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him of duties was invalid. The two are so dependent, each upon
the other, that they must stand or fall together.
The reader of the foregoing opinion
will naturally call to mind the instances
in which judges chosen for a constitu-
tional term have been deprived of their
offices 'by a legislative act abolishing
the courts. The cases here particularly
referred to are the repeal of the act
creating United States district courts at
the close of the administration of John
Adams, and the acts previously passed
in Maryland and Virginia, and after.
wards in the New England states, during
the pendency of the war of 1812, by
which courts composed of judges ob-
noxious to the existing political major-
ity wwere legislated out of existence. In
those cases, however, the rightfulness
of the legislation was not judicially
passed upon, for the reason that, with
both the legislative and executive de-
partments of the government refusing
to recognise the judges thus legislated
against, redress, if they were wronged,
was practically Impossible. Any court
is powerless when it thus stands'alone.
Some cases are referred to in the
abdfre opinion which have considerable
analogy to the one decided. In Common-
wealth v. Gamble, 63 Penn. St. 343,
where a judge had'been commissioned
to hold for a constitutional term of ten
years, "if he should behave himself
well," it was held that the legislature
had no power to determine that a
breach in this condition had occurred,
and that an act annexing the judge's
district to that of another judge, thereby
depriving him of his office, was void.
In the course of the opinion the court
say: "I seems like a solecism to
regard thai to be an office in this
country to, which there are no duties
assigned. 'An office,' says Kent (vol.
3, p. 454), 'consists in a right and cor-
respondent duty to execute a public or
private trust and to take -the emolu-
ments.' 11 People v. Dubois, 23 Ill.
547, was somewhat similar on its facts,
and the conclusion was the same. See
also Howard v. State, 10 Ind. 99; State
v. iltz, 11 La. Ann. 439 ; People v.
Kelsey, 34 Cal. 470. The case of State
v. 31essmore, 14 Wis. 163, is not so
directly in point, but the principle de-
clared is substantially the same, and
this was followed in State v. Brunst, 26
Wis. 412, by the decision that the legis-
lature cannot take from a constitutional
officer the duties and functions usually
pertaining to his office, and confer them
upon an officer appointed in a different
manner and holding office by a different
tenure. The office in question was that
of sheriff, and the duties and functions
of which he was to be deprived were
those regarding the custody and care
of prisoners sentenced to the county
jail. Warner v. People, 2 Denio 272,
is some authority for this conclusion,
and the case of King v. Hunter, 65 N. C.
603, decides that where one of the duties
of the office of sheriff was the collection
of taxes, the legislature could not pro-
vide for the appointment of a tax-col-
lector io whom those duties should be
transferred from the incumbent in office
when the act was passed. The doctrine
declared is obviously the same with that
on which is rested the principal case.
The cases of People v. Bull, 46 N. Y.
57, and People v. McKinney, 52 Id.
374, have also some bearing, in this :
that they both hold that the legislature
cannot by indirection avoid and defeat
a constitutional provision. In both it
was held that where an office was by
the constitution to be filled by popular
election the legislature could not pro-
long the term of an incumbent ; this
being equivalent to a legislative elec-
tion for the enlarged term. Compare
Oregon v. Pyle, 1 Ore. 149. In Allen
v. .AfcKeen, 1 Sumner 276, an inclina-
tion was evinced to hold that one hold-
BRAGG v. MORRILL.
ing an office for the term of good beha- v. Adams, 3 Gray 126; Stand jford v.
vior was to be regarded as holding by Wingate, 2 Duvall 443; Robinson v.
contract with the state for that term. Vhite, 26 Ark. 139 ; Oregon v. Pyle,
But see Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 1 Ore. 149 ; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2
402 ; Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn. St. S. C. N. S. 81. Where the term of
49; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 353; office is prescribed by law, the appoint-
s. c. in error, 5 N. Y. 285 ; Bryan v. ing power cAnnot limit it to a shorter
Cattell, 15 Iowa 538 ; People v. Haskell, term by a provision in -the commission
5 Cal. 357 ; Darb v. Houston, 22 Geo. or appointment: Stadler v. Detroit, 13
506; Wilcox v. Rodman, 46 Mo. 323; Mich. 346.
Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103; Taft T. M. C.
Supreme Court of 'ermont.
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The vendor of an article sold for a particular purpose does not impliedly war-
rant it against latent defects to him unknown, and caused by the unskilfulness or
negligence of the manufacturer or previous owner, except when the sale is, in
itself, equivalent to an affirmation that the article has certain inherent qualities
inconsistent with the alleged defects. Thus, when defendant, a machinist and
founder, sold a piece of wrought iron shafting, of which he was not the maker,
but which he turned and prepared for the reception of pulleys, and which he sup-
posed to be sound, to be used in running machinery in a carriage shop, and the
shaft upon being put to the described use broke because of a flaw and an imperfect
weld, it was held that there was no implied warranty of its soundness.
AssumPsrr upon a warranty of a piece of wrought iron shafting.
The case was referred, and the court rendered judgment on the re-
port for the defendant. Exceptions by the plaintiff. The case
appears from the opinion.
Young, for the plaintiff, cited Beal v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114;
Pease v. Sabin, 38 Id. 432; Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533 ; Brown
v. Edgington, 2 M. & G. 279; Shepherd v. P3ybus, 3 Id. 868;
Gtray v. Cox, 4 B. & C. 108; 1 Parsons Cont. 469.
-Edwards and Dickerman, for the defendant, cited Goslin v. Hod-
son and Pisk,.24 Vt. 140; Paddock v. Strobridge, 29 Id. 470;
Sanbbrn v. HZerring et al., 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 457; Emerton v.
Mathews, 1 Id. 231 ; Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. 139 ; Brown v.
.Edgington, 2 M. & G. 279; Bluett v. Osborne, 1 Stark. 384.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ross, J.-The plaintiff claims to recover of the defendant dam-
ages sustained by two defects-one an imperfect weld and the other
a flaw-in a wrought iron shaft, twenty-four feet long and two
